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The Bank and its Current Account Customer
Prior to the decision of Foley v. Hill1 legal opinion was mixed as 
to what was the exact relationship which existed between a bank- ancl 
its customer. Originally it was the custom for a customer to leave his 
coin and plate with a goldsmith for safekeeping, to be delivered up 
in specie upon demand. Out of this practice arose the opinion that 
the goldsmith was a bailee of the goocls. Later the goldsmith varied 
his business. Instead of letting the money deposited with him lie 
idle he put it to work in earning money for himself; he also commenced 
to refer to himself as a “banker”. Eventually, the conception arose 
that this “banker” occupied the position of an agent or trustee in rela­
tion to his customer-principal and as such was obliged to handle de­
posits in a fiduciary manner. The nature of the relationship finally 
was decided by the f louse of Lords in the case of Foley v. Hill1.
In delivering the judgment of the House, the Lord Chancellor* 
declared that the banker and customer relationship is that of debtor 
and creditor; oncc a customer deposits money in his bank the owner­
ship immediately passes to it. Ilis Lordship also pointed out that 
as a result of acquiring the ownership the bank is free to use the money 
as it secs fit anci is not obliged to inform its customer how the deposit 
is employed.4
It is doubtful if the banking business would have survived if the 
House of Lords had found a fiduciary relationship existing between a 
bank and its customer. Certainly banking would not have obtained 
its present day position in the commercial world if such had been the 
decision. A fiduciary relationship would have restricted a bank to 
trustee investments only; employment of deposits in other ventures 
would have made the bank liable for actions for breach of trust. In­
stead of being 111 the banking business the bank would have become a 
trust company.
The debt incurred by a bank in taking its customer’s deposit upon 
a current account is 110 ordinary debt. At common law, unless there is 
an agreement to the contrary, a debtor must seek out his creditor and 
pay him, otherwise the debtor is in default. Also, a debt usually 
accrues due upon a specified date or upon the occurrence of a certain 
event. The debt which a bank owes to its customer, however, is not gov­
erned bv these rules.
In delivering judgment in the case of Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Cor­
poration* the English Court of Appeal declared that the debt incurred
I. »1848i. 2. H. L . Cas. 28.
2 En g lish  cases u su ally  re fe r  to a ‘ b a n k e r"  b ecau se th e  b an k in g  bu siness in E n g lan d  
is carried  on larg ely  by  in div iduals, p artn ersh ip s and in co rp o rated  com p an ies A s 
th e  b an k in g  bu siness in Canada is carried  on only  by in co rp o rated  com p an ies. (S e e  
T h e  B a n k  A ct, R . S . C ., 1952, c. 12, s. 4i C an ad ian  cases re fe r  to  a “ b a n k ” .
3. Lord  C o tten h am , L . C.
4. A t pp. 36-37.
5. 11921) 3 K  B  110.
U .N . B. LA W  JOURNAL 25
bv a bank is not due until its customer lias made a valid demand for 
repayment. Otherwise, as the Court pointed out, the debt would be 
due as soon as a customer made a deposit. From this would then arise 
the absurd situation in w hich the bank would have to return the deposit 
immediately’ or be in default; and if the customer was not available the 
bank would have to seek him out, which would mean that the bank 
could elose the account without first giving noticc to its customer. 
In a like fashion, a customer could bring an action for the credit 
amount of his account before lie first made a demand for its repayment; 
the bank’s first indication that a customer wanted his money returned 
would be the servicc of a writ of summons. Under these circumstances, 
the Court declared that an implied term of the relationship which 
exists between a bank and its current account customer is that a de­
mand should be made first for rcpavment before the debt becomes due. 
That is, the debt is not due until the customer lias made a demand 
upon his bank for rcpavment of the deposit or part of it.
In the Joachimson case the plaintiff, acting 011 behalf of his firm, 
made 110 demand for repayment of the balance of a current account 
held by the defendant before bringing an action to enforce repayment. 
Consequently the Court dismissed tne proceedings; a cause of action 
only arises when a demand lias been made and it is dishonoured.
I11 delivering judgment in the Joachimson case, Atkin L. J. point­
ed out that as a result of the Court’s decision the statutory time in which 
to bring an action for rcpavment of the deposit does not run from the 
time the deposit is made, but rather from the time a valid demand is 
made for rcpavmcnt and it is refused.0 This means that a bank would 
be obliged to honour a demand for repayment of a deposit which had 
remained dormant for, say, fiftv years. If the bank refused to repav, 
the statutorv period in which a customer could bring an action would 
then commence to run. T o  avoid the accumulation of dormant accounts
111 Canadian banks, however, The Bank Act7 provides that after an ac­
count has remained dormant for 10 years the amount of the account and 
any interest thereon is to be transferred to the Bank of Canada. After 
that a customer’s right to demand repayment from his own bank is bar­
red. His demand must then be directed to the Bank of Canada, although 
110 statutory time runs against him as to when such demand may be 
made.
Considerable thought also was given in the Joachimson case to the 
effect of its decision in regard to the attachment of a garnishee order 
upon a current account. Tne common law rule is that a garnishee order 
cannot attach a debt until it is due or accruing due. Therefore, if a 
current account is not due until a demand is made upon it, how can a 
garnishee order attach the account before the demand has been made? In 
answer to this, Bankes L. J. expressed the opinion of the Court when he
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said that a garnishee order was a sufficient demand by operation of law 
to satisfy the bank's right to have a demand before the credit amount of 
the account became due".'1
W hen a customer opens a current account, he enters into a con­
tract’" with his bank. It is vcrv seldom, however, that the actual 
terms of the contract arc expressly set out. Consequently, the Court 
often is called upon (such as in the above-mention eel Joachimson case) 
to declare what the terms are. Of course, a Court will neither make 
nor alter a contract: that is the duty and right of the parties to it. If 
a term of a contract is lacking, however, which is obv iously a necessary 
term and which both parties must have intended to be in the con­
tract but hav e not expressed it because its necessity was so obvious that 
it was taken for granted, a Court w ill not hesitate to declare that term 
to be an implied term of the contract.11 It is in this manner that most 
of the terms, which now arc known to comprise the contract between 
a bank and its customer, have conic to light.
The bank, 011 its part, undertakes to honour immediately its cus­
tomer’s mandate1- to the extent that there is a crcdit balance owing to 
that customer.13 Upon payment, the bank is entitled to debit the 
account to that extent.1* However, if the bank pays a mandate upon 
which a customer’s signature has been forged as the drawer, the bank 
has 110 right to debit tlie account. The bank is estopped from debiting 
the account, not because the bank has failed to notice that the signature 
does not belong to the customer indicated, but because there is in fact 110 
mandate upon which to act: the ostensible mandate is merely a value­
less piece of paper. At 011c time it was the considered opinion that a 
bank was unctcr a duty to know its customer’s signature13, and failure 
to observe a forgery was negligence for which the bank had to stand the 
loss of the amount so paid. This fallacy was corrected by Mathew J. 
in London and River Plate v. Bank of Liverpool'6 where he pointed out 
that a forgcrv could be so cleverly executed that it would be impossible 
for a bank using ordinary care to detect it.17
The bank further undertakes to receive and to collect bills for the 
account: the money so received being borrowed by the bank with the 
undertaking that it shall be repaid upon demand.18 It is agreed, hovv-
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ever, that the demand must be made at the branch at which the ac­
count is kept; a customer cannot expect repayment at any branch.,s It 
is also agreed that, as a customer’s mandate may be outstanding for sev­
eral days in the ordinary course of business, the bank will not close an 
account which is in credit except upon reasonable notice; the notice 
will depend upon the nature of the account and the facts and circum­
stances of the case.19
During the operation of an account a bank cannot help but 
become intimate with a customer’s business dealings and private af­
fairs. For this reason there is imposed upon a bank in relation to its 
customer a confidence similar to that existing between an agent and his 
principal.20 Information pertaining to a customer which is gathered bv 
a bank in its capacity as a bank and during the currency of the account 
must be held in strict secrecy. Disclosure of such information to a 
third party could give rise to an action against the bank for breach of 
the implied contract not to disclose confidential matters.-1
This duty of secrecy applies not only to the condition of the ac­
count and other facts gathered from the account’s operation, but also 
to information pertaining to the customer which is gathered from other 
sources, such as someone else’s account, provided it is gathered bv the 
bank while acting in its official capacity.21 It is doubtful if the bank’s 
duty to remain silent about information already gathered ceases the 
moment an account is closed, although it is unlikely that the duty 
extends to information gathered after the account is in fact closed.22
However the above dutv of secrecy is not absolute. As Banks L. J. 
pointed out in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of Eng­
land-', there appear to be four qualifications when disclosure is justi­
fied. 'These qualifications are:
(a) where disclosure is under compulsion bv law;
(b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose;
(c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure;
(d) where the disclosure is made bv the express or implied consent 
of the customer.24
At the time a customer opens an account he impliedly agrees on 
his part to exercise reasonable care in executing his mandates so as not 
to mislead the bank.25 If he issues a mandate which contains a patent 
ambiguity the bank is justified, indeed it would almost appear to be 
a duty, in delaying payment until the true facts are ascertained because 
the bank’s duty to honour a mandate is correlative to the customer’s to
19 Prosperity , Lim ite d v. Lloyds B a n k ,  Lim ite d (1923* 39 T.  L . R 372.
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a ban k  rn d  its cu stom er, th e fo rm er in han dlin g  th e  la t te r ’s tran sactio n s  com es 
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22. L o c. c it ., per B a n k e s  L . J .  a t  p. 473.
23 119241 1 K.  B .  461.
24 A t p. 473.
25 London J o i n t  Sto ck B a n k  v. M acm illan  [19181 A. C. 777. a t p. 789.
28 U .N .B .  LA W  JOURNAL
first drawing it in an unambiguous form.-“ If the ambiguity is latent, 
however, and the bank bona ride acts upon the wrong meaning, there 
seems little doubt but that the bank has the right to deDit its customer’s 
account for the amount so paid because the error has occurred due to 
the customer’s negligencc in not issuing a clear order.-7
The customer further undertakes to exercisc reasonable care in ex­
ecuting his mandate so as not to facilitate forgery.-’5 If a customer issues 
a mandate containing gaps in it so that the fraudulent alteration of the 
amount is facilitated, lie is bound bv the instrument as altered if the 
bank honours it bona fide. It is a breach of a customer’s duty to issue 
such a mandate and forgery is a natural and dircct consequence to be 
anticipated when a mandate is so drawn.25 There arc some authorities 
who feel that in such a case the true basis for allowing the bank to debit 
the account is that the customer has estopped himself by his conduct 
from denying the validity of the altered cheque.2* But it seems to be 
generally accepted, however, that the true grounds arc based upon the 
customer’s failure to carry out properly his contractual duty.20
As already indicated, the duties set out in the foregoing discussion 
have been established judicially as implied obligations. W hat other obli­
gations exist in the relationship must await further elucidation by the 
Court as it is improbable that the practice will ever arise wherefey an 
express comprehensive contract will be entered into by a customer at 
the time of opening an account. Of course, if such a contract is entered 
into, an express term therein will bar the application of any incompatible 
implied obligation as herein set out.30
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